we fnd it appropriate to continue all interim orders which are operating till today and are not already continued by some other courts / authority including this court and the same shall remain in force till 30.04.2020, subject to liberty to parties to move for vacation of interim orders only in extreme urgent cases. Thus, all interim orders passed by this High Court at Mumbai, Aurangabad, Nagpur and Panaji as also all courts/ Tribunal and authorities subordinate over which it has power of superintendence expiring before 30.04.2020, shall continue to operate till then. It is clarifed that such interim orders which are not granted for limited duration and therefore, are to operate till further orders, shall remain unaffected by this order
In terms of section 205 of the Act, the assessee/deductee cannot be called upon to pay tax, to the extent to which tax had been deducted from the payments due. Consequently, it follows that credit for such tax deducted at source, which is deducted from the account of the deductee, by the deductor, is to be allowed as taxes paid in the hands of the deductee, irrespective of the fact whether the same has been deposited by the deductor to the credit of the Central Government or not. The deductee in such circumstances cannot be denied credit of tax deducted at source on its behalf. Under the Act, the provisions are enshrined under which recovery of tax from the account of the person, who had deducted the such tax, are provided
If the nature of services rendered have a proximate nexus with the extraction of production of mineral oils, it would be outside the ambit of the definition of FTS. In the instant case, since the nature of services rendered by the Petitioner gets excluded from the definition of “FTS”, in light of what is discussed above, the next logical question that arises for consideration is whether the Petitioner can claim the benefit of Section 44BB. The answer to this question is contingent on factual determination, as the legal position has changed from April 01, 2011. It is now required to be considered whether the receipts in the hands of the assessee qualify to be “royalty” or not? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then in that event, the relevant provision would now be 44DA(1).
business models are constantly evolving, and as the rapid communication modes such as internet and social media have completely transformed the way businesses communicate, it is time that the law is seen in tandem with the ground realities of the business world, rather than in the strict confines of what was decided in the judicial precedents, in the context of a different business world when these ground realities did not exist. Today, virtual and intangible business connections are perhaps far more critical, important and commonplace than the conventional brick and mortar business connections half a century ago, and, therefore, to disregard these business connections as a real and intimate business connection leading to earning of income by the non-residents, only because Hon’ble Courts, while delivering judgments several decades ago, could not visualize the same and hedge their observations about such possibilities, will certainly be travesty of justice.
Taking a cue from Varghese case, we therefore, hold that Section 143(1-A) can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by the Revenue by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it
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